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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: VARIATION BETWEEN
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE UNDER SECTION 2-207
AT COMMON LAW, the formation of a binding contract requires an
acceptance conforming to the terms of the offer.' Any variance in
the terms of the acceptance is considered a rejection of the offer and a
counteroffer which must be accepted by the original offeror before a
valid contract arises.'
Section 2-207(I) of the Uniform Commercial Code' (UCC) relaxes
these rigid rules in order to give binding effect to expressions of accept-
ance even though they include terms varying from those of the offer,
"unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms." Additional terms in the acceptance are re-
garded by section 2-207(2) as proposals for additions to the contract,
except that "between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless... they materially alter it .... "' The drafters of the UCC indi-
'See i CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 8±, 83 (1950); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 29 (x952); x
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 77, 73 ( 3 d ed. x957)5 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 59
(1932).
' See i CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 1; 77 CJ.S., OP. cit. supra note 1i i WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS §§ 73, 77 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 6o (1932).
Immaterial variances, however, may have no effect. See Newspaper Readers
Service, Inc. v. Cannonsburg Pottery Co., 146 F.2d 963 ( 3 d Cir. 1945); Valashinas
v. Koniuto, 3o8 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.zd 300 (1954). Precatory language or sug-
gestions as to mode of performance will not prevent an effective acceptance. See
Skinner v. Stone, 144 Ark. 353, 222 S.W. 36o (1920); Butler v. Foley, zi Mich.
668, 179 N.W. 34 (902o); Rucker v. Saunders, 18z N.C. 607, 1o9 S.E. 857 (1921).
" References to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] are
to the 1957 Official Text with Comments.
' The complete text of § 2-207 is as follows:
11(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance
is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist
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cated that this section was intended to be applicable in two typical
situations where the common law prevented formation of a contract: (i)
where there is a prior oral or informal agreement followed by a con-
firmation including terms materially altering the agreement, and (2)
where a writing intended as a dosing or confirmation of an agreement
includes further minor suggestions.5
In the recent case of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co.,6
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted
section 2-207 in still another context. Plaintiff, a manufacturer of cello-
phane bags for packaging vegetables, mailed the defendant a written
order for adhesive emulsion which the latter produced for use on cello-
phane.7 The defendant sent the plaintiff an acknowledgment which
included provisions excluding all warranties and which required the
buyer to notify the defendant immediately if those terms were not
"acceptable." '  The goods were shipped the following day. Plaintiff,
without objecting to defendant's attempt to limit its liability, used the
emulsion which, plaintiff contended, failed to adhere properly. Thus,
in the present case, there was neither the prior informal agreement nor
the insignificant variances contemplated by the drafters of section 2-207.
The district court, at the close of all the evidence, directed a verdict
for the defendant. On appeal, plaintiff claimed that under section
of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supple-
mentary terms incorporated under any provisions of this Act."
' "This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is where
an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence between
the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal acknowledg-
ments or memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms
not discussed. The other situation is one in which a wire or letter expressed and
intended as the closing or confirmation of an agreement adds further minor suggestions
or proposals such as 'ship by Tuesday,' 'rush,' 'ship draft against bill of lading in-
spection allowed,' or the like." UCC § 2-207, Comment i.
0 297 F.2d 497 (sst Cir. 1962).
'The case concerned two sales of adhesive emulsion-one in May and one in
October of z959. The appeal as to the May transaction was disposed of on procedural
grounds. Id. at 5oo-o. Only the October transaction was decided on the merits,
.and it is, therefore, the one discussed in this note.
'The acknowledgment stated conspicuously on its face: "'All goods sold without
warranties, express or implied, and subject to the terms on reverse side.'" On the
back was a further disclaimer of "'. . . any and all warranties, guarantees, or repre-
sentations whatsoever,'" as well as a provision stating: "' This acknowledgment con-
tains all of the terms of this purchase and sale .... If these terms are not acceptable,
Buyer must so notify Seller at once?" 297 F.zd at 498-99.
*Although there was no direct testimony, the plaintiff was found to have received
the acknowledgment no later than the goods. Id. at 498.
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2-2o7l° a binding contract was formed on the terms of its order.
Plaintiff contended that defendant's disclaimer was an additional term
materially altering the agreement and, therefore, was not part of the
contract, but merely a proposal by defendant for an addition to the
contract to which the plaintiff did not assent." The First Circuit, al-
though agreeing that the disclaimer of warranties materially altered
the- agreement,"2 concluded that defendant's acceptance was "expressly"
conditioned on the plantiffs assent to the new terms in defendant's
acknowledgment and affirmed the lower court's decision."3 In effect,
therefore, no contract was formed until the plaintiff assented to the
conditions by accepting and using the emulsion with knowledge 4 of the
disclaimer provisions. 5
Section 2-2o7(2) regards material alterations contained in the
acceptance as mere proposals for additions to an already existing con-
"
0 The court applied Massachusetts law. Id. at 499. Massachusetts had adopted
the present text of UCC § 2-207 without revision. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. io6, § 2-207
(Supp. 1958).
"1 By the terms of § 2-207(2), the offeror need not expressly reject material altera-
tions to prevent their incorporation into the contract. If there already is a binding
contract, the offeror's performance is expected and, therefore, will not normally give
rise to an implied agreement to the alterations. On the contrary, if the proposed
changes are important ones, it is reasonable to assume that the offeror does not consent
to their inclusion in the contract. Express assent, therefore, is required for their in-
corporation. See UCC § 2-207, Comment 3. If there is no contract because the
acceptance was expressly conditional, see note x5 infra.
2 297 F.zd at 499. Comment 4 to UCC § 2-207 specifically refers to a dis-
claimer of standard warranties as a clause which would materially alter the contract.
It indicates that the test of materiality is whether or not inclusion of the clause
would result in surprise or hardship to the other party if he were not expressly aware
of it.
The Comments, which explain the purposes of the various provisions of the UCC,
were added "to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an integrated whole,
and to safeguard against misconstruction." UCC, i957 OFFICIAL TEXT i. Although
the Comments were not enacted into law in Massachusetts, they are annexed to the
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts and were referred to by the First Circuit as support
for its finding.
2 97 F.2d at 5oo.
1 See note 9 supra.
15 297 F.2d at 5oo. By the court's reasoning, the acknowledgment constituted a
counteroffer followed by shipment of the goods. Acceptance of goods or services
offered may create a binding contract. See Champlin v. Jackson, 317 Mass. 461, 58
N.E.2d 757 (1945); UCC § 2-2045 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 75 (195o) ; I WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 91D ( 3 d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72 (932). There-
fore, plaintiff's acceptance of the emulsion formed a binding contract on the basis of
the defendant's counteroffer. The plaintiff did not have to agree expressly to the
disclaimer, for it was one of the terms of the counteroffer and resulting contract.
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tract,"6 which do not become part of the contract "unless expressly
agreed to by the other party."" If the offeror does not assent to in-
clusion of the new terms, the offeree remains bound to a contract with
which he is dissatisfied. The offeree can protect himself against being
bound on terms other than his own only by making his acceptance
"expressly" conditional on the offeror's assent to his proposals.18
Thus, as is seen here, the interpretation of the word "expressly"
can be crucial.
Normally, the word "expressly" denotes an explicit, unequivocal
statement.' However, such a literal interpretation would be un-
realistic in the context of a statute dealing with the formative stages of
commercial agreements. Businessmen often use inexplicit, though
reasonably understandable, language in their negotiations. If the
statute were construed literally, an unwary offeree who failed to recite
the required legal formula would be held to a contract on terms which
he never intended to accept, for an offeree usually will not accept an
offer unconditionally while proposing important changes in the resulting
obligation. As the Court of Appeals pointed out,2 0 it would be very
unrealistic to assume that an offeree who adds new terms unilaterally
burdensome on the offeror intends to accept the offer unconditionally
and to depend solely on the generosity of the offeror to assume the new
restrictions. The offeror could hardly be expected to adopt such
burdensome provisions if he could have an enforceable contract on his
own terms by simply ignoring or expressly rejecting the new proposals.
The First Circuit prevented that unfortunate result by holding that "a
response which states a condition materially altering the obligation
solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an 'cceptance... expressly
... conditional on assent to the additional ... terms,' ,,21 and thus a
rejection and counteroffer.
Sound justification for the First Circuit Court of Appeal's liberal
construction of seemingly clear statutory language can be found within
the UCC itself. Section 1-102(1) provides that the code "shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
-policies," which include clarification of the commercial law and "con-
' See note 4 supra."
'7 UCC § 2-207, Comment 3. See note x supra.
18 See note 4 Sja'a.
"See BLAcK, LAW DICnONARY (4th ed. 195 1) WEBSTER, INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY ( 3 d ed. 1961).
o 97 F.2d at soo.
"Ibid. (Omissions by the court.)
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tinued expansion of commercial practices through custom [and] usage."
Comment i to section 1-1o2 indicates that each section should be in-
terpreted so as to effectuate its particular purposes and policies. 2 2  The
provisions of section 2-207 manifest a purpose to recognize the existence
of a binding contract which previously would have been thwarted by
the strict common Jaw rules of offer and acceptance but which the
parties would reasonably understand to exist. 3 The First Circuit's
interpretation would appear to be consistent with the section's purpose.
The effect of the decision in the Roto-Lith case is merely to invoke
the common law rule in a situation seemingly overlooked by the drafters
of the UCC.24  While putting no novel burden on the offeror, the
First Circuit's interpretation serves to keep negotiations open until full
accord has been reached on the important terms of the contract. Pend-
ing revision of section 2-207 to cover more explicitly the situation
presented in Roto-Lith, 25 the interpretation adopted by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals commends itself to other UCC jurisdictions as an
equitable recognition of reasonable commercial expectations.
2 "The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy
of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application
of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in con-
formity with the purposes and policies involved." UCC § i-1o2, Comment i.
"See note 4. supra. See UCC § 2-207(3) and Comment 7.
2' See note 5 supra. UCC § 1-103 provides that the "principles of law and equity"
should supplement the provisions of the UCC unless displaced by its particular pro-
visions.
5 A workable revision might be to give binding effect to an acceptance with terms
varying from the offer, "unless acceptance is expressly, or by clear implication, made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms." The code would then
adequately cover the situations presently contemplated by § 2-207 without being unduly
harsh in situations like the Roto-Lith case.
The New York Law Revision Commission recommended that UCC § 2-207 be
restricted to immaterial variances. N.Y.L. REvIsIoN COMM'N, REPORT, N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 65 371 (1956). However, the New York legislature in adopting the UCC
left § 2-207 unchanged, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, c. 553 (effective September 27, 1964).
